Un antisémitisme nouveau? The debate about a 'new antisemitism' in France by Peace, Timothy
 1 
Un antisémitisme nouveau? The debate about a ‘new 
antisemitism’ in France 
 
 
TIMOTHY PEACE 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT Nowhere has the debate about a ‘new antisemitism’ been as fierce and relevant as in 
France. In recent years this country has witnessed high recorded levels of antisemitism, prompting 
many commentators to claim that this constituted an antisémitisme nouveau. Something has indeed 
changed, at least in terms of the nature, frequency and perpetrators of antisemitic violence in 
France. Previously connected to the extreme right, it has now become associated with a group that 
is itself a victim of discrimination – Muslims living in the poor neighbourhoods (banlieues). 
Statistics produced by the French watchdog on racism and antisemitism are firstly discussed and 
explained as well as the effect of the Middle East conflict. The article then traces the debate on this 
‘new antisemitism’ in the French context, contrasting the views of the label’s promoters and 
opponents. It is argued that while antisemitism has undoubtedly evolved, the ‘new’ label is 
effectively erroneous as it fuses supposedly leftist and ‘Muslim’ antisemitism into one entity when 
they are not necessarily linked. Vital clarifications on the distinction between anti-Zionism and 
antisemitism are also made along with suggestions for further research. 
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In the autumn of 2000, France witnessed an explosion of antisemitism, unprecedented since the 
Second World War. In that year alone, a total of 744 antisemitic incidents were recorded (520 in the 
month of October alone) compared to only 82 the previous year. This wave of anti-Jewish acts 
continued throughout the years that followed and peaked in 2002 and 2004, with 936 and 974 
incidents respectively.1 In 2006, the death of Ilan Halimi, a young Jewish man, shocked and 
repulsed the nation. Lured to a flat in the suburbs of Paris, he was subsequently tortured to death by 
his captors who, believing that Jews are wealthy, sought a financial ransom for his release. 
Antisemitism became the major form of racism in France, at least in terms of recorded violence, and 
anti-Jewish hatred is now, according to one prominent scholar, ‘a permanent feature of Jewish 
life’.2 Often these incidents involve threats, insults and other forms of intimidation directed at 
members of the Jewish community - Europe’s largest. However, a large proportion also includes 
acts of violence such as personal assaults, vandalism and arson of synagogues, attacks on Jewish 
property such as vehicles, businesses, schools and cultural centres, as well as the desecration of 
Jewish cemeteries. Expressions of antisemitism in the public domain also became more frequent, 
notable examples being slogans and chants such as “Mort aux Juifs” (death to the Jews) emanating 
from certain groups of protestors at demonstrations against the actions of the Israel Defense Forces 
(IDF) and the U.S. led invasion of Iraq. The problem of antisemitism in schools was also 
highlighted with the publication of several articles and books3 as well as some documentaries 
screened on national television which appeared to show growing tensions amongst pupils from 
different religious communities. Investigations found that antisemitism was also being propagated 
at certain universities.4 
The French Jewish community has become increasingly concerned and fearful about this 
situation. Many Jewish parents have taken their children out of state schools as a result and an 
increasing number of French Jews have even left their country in recent years, many emigrating to 
the United States, Canada and Israel. The Israeli government itself has positively encouraged Jews 
to make their aliyah. In January 2002, the Israeli Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Rabbi Michael 
Melchior described France as the worst Western country for antisemitism and in July 2004, then 
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon invited French Jews to move to Israel in order to escape this threat.5 
One of the most severe condemnations of the situation in France came from the American Jewish 
Congress (AJC) which called on Hollywood stars and producers to consider boycotting the 2002 
Cannes film festival in protest. In the wake of such criticism and the indisputably high levels of 
anti-Jewish attacks, the French government launched a sustained campaign against antisemitism. 
Measures included the creation of a ministerial committee charged with tackling the problem, a 
massive urban regeneration programme and a substantial contribution towards the costs of increased 
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security at private Jewish schools. A series of new laws were also passed in order to improve the 
monitoring of antisemitism, institute severer punishments for hate crimes and increase the number 
of people convicted of such misdemeanours in order to send out a clear message. During his time as 
minister of the Interior, current president Nicolas Sarkozy issued numerous statements in order to 
reassure the French Jewish community and zealously pursued zero-tolerance measures concerning 
antisemitism. It should also be noted that the controversial law banning ‘ostentatious’ religious 
insignia and symbols in French state schools in 2004 was also, at least in part, a result of the 
concerns about antisemitism in France.6 
This rise in antisemitic incidents in France since the year 2000 produced a steady stream of 
books, articles and reports dealing with the topic, both in France and internationally and launched 
the debate about the existence of a ‘new antisemitism’. The subject became entangled in some of 
the wider issues in French politics and society such as Foreign affairs, domestic security and 
criminality and concerns about immigration and integration. The debate found resonance outside 
the usual remit of scholars and academics on antisemitism to include journalists, lawyers, religious 
leaders and other opinion makers. Much of the discussion focused on who was committing these 
acts of antisemitism. Previously connected exclusively to the extreme right, antisemitism became 
commonly associated with a group that is itself a victim of prejudice and discrimination –‘Arab-
Muslims’.7 Indeed the implication of France’s Muslims population was one of the most 
controversial issues in the whole debate, not least because it came at a time when much scrutiny 
was already being placed on them due to other national and international events. 
 
Gathering the statistics 
 
The discussion about a ‘new antisemitism’ was in part propelled by the publication of statistics 
proving what many had already suspected, that there had been a huge increase in the number of 
recorded incidents since the year 2000. France has some of the most sophisticated methods for 
monitoring racist and antisemitic acts in the whole of the EU and the anti-racist law of 1990 (loi 
Gayssot) established the convention for the publication of an annual report on racism, antisemitism 
and xenophobia through the Commision Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme (CNCDH).8 
Unofficial statistics on antisemitism are also produced by the Service de protection de la 
communauté juive (SPCJ),9 although I will restrict my analysis here to the CNCDH reports which 
contain data gathered by the Interior, Justice and Education Ministries. The figures that most 
concern us here are those collected by the Interior Ministry which oversees the police and 
gendarmerie. Figures collected by these two organisations are passed on to the Direction centrale 
du renseignement intérieur (DCRI)10 which collates, analyses and presents these statistics to the 
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CNCDH. The collection of this data and the exchange of information between the police and 
gendarmerie has been significantly improved in recent years.11 Statistics on antisemitism gathered 
by the Interior Ministry are divided into two main categories; ‘threats’ (menaces) and ‘acts of 
violence’ (actions violentes). The former category includes graffiti, inflammatory literature (tracts 
provocateurs) including holocaust denial12 and other kinds of written or verbal threatening 
behaviour (such as bomb threats). Violence includes physical assaults (agressions), arson attacks 
(incendies) and damage to property (dégradtions) including the desecration of cemeteries. The 
figures only take into account incidents which have been officially reported to the police. 
The Justice Ministry provides information on court cases and convictions of hate crimes 
through information collected by the Direction des affaires criminelles et des grâces (DACG). 
Recent increases in the number of convictions do not translate into a rise in crimes of a racist or 
antisemitic nature but need to be understood in the context of new legal measures which started to 
have an effect in 2005.13 It has been argued that these new laws have led to an over-reporting of the 
actual number incidents perpetrated,14 although this is actually false because these laws have only 
had an effect on the Justice Ministy’s figures, not those provided by the Interior Ministry. Since 
2004 the numbers of reported antisemitic incidents have generally decreased and the law passed on 
9th March 2004 merely slightly increased the number of misdemeanours that could be potentially 
classed as antisemitic ‘threats’. These new legal guidelines have made no difference to the way 
antisemitic violence is recorded and it is naturally these figures which are of most concern. Indeed, 
despite the attempt of some authors to downplay the levels of antisemitism in France, or even 
portray it as a construction of the ‘Israeli lobby’15, the recorded levels of violent acts of 
antisemitism remain worryingly high when compared to the pre-2000 period. 
The statistics provided by the Ministry of Education are also presented in the CNCDH 
reports. In 2001, French schools implemented the use of software (SIGNA) which recorded acts of 
violence, in particular those of a racist character. This system, unique in the EU, was introduced as 
a way of combating rising violence in French schools. It was replaced in 2007 by a supposedly 
improved software system - (SIVIS) after a boycott of the SIGNA system by headmasters in 2006.16 
Although the CNCDH reports on these figures, they must not be confused with those provided by 
the Interior Ministry which form the basis for the ‘official’ figures illustrated in fig. 1 (below).  
 
figure 1 here 
 
In fact, given the interruption in data collection in 2006-2007 and the introduction of the new 
system, information on antisemitism in schools was not even presented in the latest report published 
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by the CNCDH in 2008. It is misleading to insinuate that these statistics are contributing to the 
over-reporting of antisemitism17 as the only incidents that are included are those that result in the 
lodging of an official complaint with the police, and therefore only those of a relatively serious 
nature. 
A common assumption about antisemitism in France is that it is directly connected to events 
in the Middle East and must therefore be seen as ‘revenge for the Israeli oppression of their fellow 
Muslims’.18 Although between 2000 and 2002 there did appear to be a clear link between 
antisemitism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (the initial wave of antisemitism occurred in 
September/October 2000 coinciding with the second intifada) there has subsequently been no 
overall correlation. In 2004 for example, the year which saw the highest figures of recorded 
antisemitism, there was no distinctive peak in antisemitic activity as could be observed in 2002 
around the time of the IDF’s ‘Operation Defensive Shield’. The CNCDH itself acknowledges that 
there is now no observable link between events in the Middle East and acts of antisemitism. This 
further complicates any understanding of contemporary antisemitism in France. Indeed, events 
closer to home my also play their part, a partial rise in antisemitism in February and March 2006 for 
example was attributed to the effect of the media coverage of the murder of Ilan Halimi.  
Central to the debate about whether a ‘new antisemitism’ exists in France is the question of 
who is committing these acts, particularly those classed as violent. The CNCDH reports contain 
information about the perpetrators (or ‘vectors’) of antisemitic threats and violence and highlights 
in particular those which can be attributed to the extreme-right (milieux extrémistes de droite) and 
‘Arab-Muslims’ (les milieux arabo-musulans). The fact that information about ethnic or religious 
affiliation is recorded in this manner is actually an anomaly within the French legal system.19 For 
the years 2000-2003 the reports did not include these figures and merely stated that many of the 
perpetrators were the children of North African immigrants from the ‘difficult neighbourhoods’ 
(quartiers dits « sensibles ») and that the involvement of the extreme right was on the wane. It was 
not until the report for 2004 that they released any actual figures about how many antisemitic acts 
were associated with either the extreme right or ‘Arab-Muslims’. These figures revealed that since 
the year 2000, ‘Arab-Muslims’ had overtaken the extreme right in terms of antisemitic threats and 
violence (see fig. 2).  
 
figure 2 here 
 
However, given that on average 50% of antisemitic acts are not attributed to any particular 
group, deciphering who is responsible is complicated even further. The only certainty is that ‘Arab-
Muslims’ are now often implicated in acts of antisemitism which did not appear to be the case 
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before the year 2000. However, the motivation for such acts remains unclear and under researched. 
Studies have demonstrated that antisemitic prejudice amongst young people in the banlieues is 
certainly very prevalent20 and one recent survey also revealed that antisemitism was more frequent 
amongst those who professed Islam as their faith.21 However, there is no evidence linking Islamic 
religiosity, acts of antisemitism and the motivation behind them. Therefore, some have suggested 
that the problem of antisemitism amongst Muslims is likely to be ‘more cultural than religious’,22 in 
other words just as likely to be found amongst non-Muslim residents of the banlieues and more 
connected to non-practicing Muslims than those who are pious or involved in a particular Islamic 
organisation. Michel Wieviorka, one of the foremost experts on antisemitism in France concurs: 
 
On the whole, it does seem that the majority of violent antisemitic acts at the beginning of the decade were 
committed by young people of ‘Maghrebi immigrant origin’. Yet this was entirely disconnected to any 
organisation or collective structure and was in no way related to activists engaged in either pro-Palestinian or 
Islamist movements.23 
 
 
The intellectual debate 
 
 
The situation that developed in France led to the publishing of numerous works on the subject, 
some advancing the case of a supposed ‘new antisemitism’ distinct from its traditional form24 and 
others proposing a ‘new face’ or return of antisemitism.25 On the other hand there were those who 
argued categorically against the existence of a ‘new antisemitism’ or even using the word 
‘antisemitism’ when referring to hostility connected to the State of Israel.26 Some even implied that 
the use of such a term was a means of alimenting an existing climate of Islamophobia in France.27 
The discussion of this phenomenon first intensified around the beginning of 2002 with the 
publication of Pierre-André Taguieff’s La Nouvelle Judéophobie28 and the term ‘new antisemitism’ 
eventually gained wide currency, even being referred to in official reports written for the French 
government.29 Some authors blamed the state and other institutions of being complicit in the rise of 
this antisemitism and claimed that the French media was also somehow responsible for the rise in 
anti-Jewish attacks, particularly the way in which it presented the Middle East conflict.30 Others 
asserted that after the outbreak of antisemitic violence in 2000, the press remained silent or did not 
sufficiently report these acts.31 The allegation of media silence is surprising as there has actually 
been extensive coverage in the French press of the attacks suffered by the French Jewish 
community in recent years.32  
The drive to sell the ‘new antisemitism’ theory was perceived by a number of scholars, 
including many Jewish ones, as a kind of propaganda campaign, waged against journalists and 
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academics who are critical of Israel - what one critic labelled an ‘ideological counter-intifada by the 
unconditional supporters of Israel’.33 Consequently the ‘new antisemitism’ label was seen by many 
as merely a method for equating either criticism of Israel or anti-Zionism with antisemitism. Indeed 
a number of high profile court cases were brought against people who had been critical of Israel 
such as the journalist Daniel Mermet and the sociologist Edgar Morin (himself Jewish), who were 
accused of inciting racial hatred against Jews.34 According to Gilles William Goldnadel, the lawyer 
responsible for bringing many of these cases before the judges, ‘the case which is being brought 
against Daniel Mermet is that of new-look antisemitism’.35 Regrettably, the effect of such actions 
was to stifle any serious debate about antisemitism in France and the two camps remained 
entrenched in their respective positions. Indeed much of the literature dealing with this topic in 
France remained extremely partisan and polemical in its nature. Those supporting the ‘new 
antisemitism’ hypothesis could generally be classified as supporting a generally pro-Israeli position 
and those with pro-Palestinian sympathies argued against it. 
 
 
 
Defining the new antisemitism in France 
 
 
The use of the ‘new’ prefix is complicated by the fact that it is not always clear what this refers to. 
Amongst proponents of its usage, a consensus on its definition is currently lacking. Commentators 
have not only been unable to agree on this, but the descriptions that have been proposed often differ 
quite starkly from each other. Surveying the literature, it is indeed possible to identify three basic 
components of what may constitute antisémitisme nouveau. The first and most prominent, common 
to many definitions, is that the state of Israel and/or Zionism, has replaced ‘the Jew’ as the object of 
antipathy in the eyes of antisemites. Therefore Jews are targeted, not as individuals, but as a people 
and/or nation. In other words, Israel has become, in the words of Brian Klug, the ‘collective Jew’.36 
The journalist Sylvain Attal summarised this as the ‘detestation and criminalisation of Israel. Not as 
a government, as a state like many others, but as a symbol of something whose very right to exist is 
even questioned.’37 This assessment therefore argues that the internal nature of antisemitism has 
changed because ‘the Jew’ has been redefined. This antipathy towards Israel would thus account for 
the excessive criticism and blame for the world’s troubles often levelled at the Jewish state and its 
relative pariah status. It is argued thus that antisemitism implicitly informs the disproportionate 
criticism that Israel receives and would therefore explain why antisemitic attacks often coincide 
with events in the Middle East with Jews supposedly pay the price for this (antisemitic) hatred of 
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Israel. Taguieff’s reading of the phenomenon adds that this hatred coalesces around a representation 
of Zionism as the incarnation of absolute evil and the belief that every Jew is a ‘Zionist’.38  
The second aspect that designates antisemitism as new is its association with the Left which 
would distinguish it from supposedly ‘older’ forms. This ‘classic’ version of antisemitism refers to 
that which generally derived from the extreme right, motivated by ethnocentric/biological racism, 
nationalist chauvinism or religious bigotry. The political Left in France, broadly sympathetic to 
Israel in the early years of its existence, turned against her after the occupation of the territories 
captured during the Six-Day war. Henceforth Israel was largely depicted as a colonialist power with 
imperialist ambitions and anti-Zionism became ingrained within the discourse of the Left, 
particularly those who identified themselves as members of the so-called New Left.39 The 
mainstream left in France incarnated by the Socialist Party (PS) has always been split on the issue 
of Zionism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; however its leadership has generally supported the 
Israeli labour party and the two-state solution. Therefore the ‘new antisemitism’ of the Left is 
uniquely associated with the extreme left (including the Green Party - Les Verts) and causes such as 
anti-racism, anti-imperialism, human rights, support for the Palestinian cause, and opposition to 
Islamophobia. This has been sarcastically referred to by some commentators as Islamo-gauchisme 
or la gauche obscurantiste.40 According to this theory, ‘new antisemitism’ acquires a paradoxical 
quality because it is supposedly perpetrated in the name of just causes. However, rather than those 
on the left being directly associated with acts of antisemitism, they are accused of promoting 
‘antisemitism by proxy’ (antisémitisme par procuration) through their anti-Zionist discourse.41 This 
phenomenon associated with the left-wing intelligentsia is described by Taguieff as the ‘ideological 
metamorphosis of antisemitism from an explicit to an implicit anti-Jewish racism’.42 
Thirdly and finally, no doubt the most controversial element attributed to definitions of the 
‘new antisemitism’ is that it has a direct connection with cultural and religious origins, namely 
Islam. Some scholars do not hesitate to refer to ‘Muslim antisemitism’ and argue that the rhetoric of 
radical Islamists has influenced perceptions of Jews in France.43 Taguieff suggests that antisemitism 
is undergoing a process of Islamisation and that the leaders of radical Islam have reformulated the 
classic antisemitic allegation of a Jewish conspiracy as a Zionist and/or Western plot against 
Islam.44 This would explain why antisemitic sentiments are particularly prevalent amongst young 
French Muslims, sensitive to events in the Middle East. This view is synthesised by Eli Barnavi, 
former Israeli Ambassador to France:  
 
Previously exported from the West towards the East, antisemitism is now coming back the other 
way. It has since become an antisemitism of importation, which has mostly settled amongst those of 
a Muslim background, even though it is encouraged by irresponsible leftists….It is these Palestinians 
by proxy who are responsible for the antisemitic acts which have multiplied in France in recent 
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years, who find in these far away events, of which they fail to grasp the complexity, an easy outlet 
for their resentment and frustration.45  
 
The involvement of the Left and Muslims is consistently evoked, as Klug has noted ‘when people 
speak of a new antisemitism, they point an accusing finger at these two groups in particular’.46 Yet 
it is rarely stated how the two strands are related (apart from opposition to Israel). This, as we shall 
see, creates a number of problems. 
Firstly, one difficulty of defining this phenomenon as ‘new’ is dating its starting point. In 
France, ‘new antisemitism’ is normally used to denote that which became apparent since the year 
2000. Indeed, many commentators saw it as something which evolved after the outbreak of the 
second Palestinian intifada. However, if ‘new antisemitism’ also refers to that from the Left, dating 
this phenomenon from such a recent period must be seriously questioned. Ignoring the fact that 
antisemitism on the French left (including figures such as Alphonse Toussenel and Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon) actually has a long history, it would be more accurate to date this to 1967, since this is 
the period when hostility to Israel emerged from within the Left in France (and much of Western 
Europe). Consequently, the rise in antisemitism from the year 2000 onwards could not be the result 
of an entirely new phenomenon, but rather a new (and more violent) wave of an existing one. 
Indeed, it has been argued by Taguieff that what France has been facing is in fact the second wave 
of the ‘new antisemitism’.47 
The more pressing problem however regarding the ‘new antisemitism’ terminology is that it 
fuses supposedly leftist and ‘Muslim’ antisemitism into one entity when they are not necessarily 
linked. Taguieff for example states that today’s anti-Jewish current emanates principally from 
radical Islamists, Christian humanitarians, anti-imperialists, ‘Third Worldists’ (tiermondistes), 
‘certain elites’, anarcho-Trotskyites, anti-globalists and various regimes in the Arab world. Despite 
all these groups having in common either a relationship with the Left or Islam, it appears to be an 
impossibly long list which does not include any distinctions whatsoever. The pluralistic nature that 
Taguieff ascribes to the ‘new antisemitism’ must indeed be questioned as it is unrealistic to 
compare and merge the ideas of radical Islamists with pacifist Christian humanitarians! The 
assertion that the ‘new antisemitism’ is composed of such an impossibly wide array of protagonists 
appears disingenuous, as the only common denominator between these groups is their critical 
position vis-à-vis Israel, whether it be extreme or moderate. This has the effect of associating 
certain opinions or political positions with acts of antisemitic violence which can only lead to 
confusion. 
Therefore, if such a term were to be used, one would have to see the ‘new antisemitism’ as 
constituting two strains, one which is supposedly propagated from within the Left and another that 
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is either inspired by interpretations of Islam, or is at least a cultural phenomenon that seems 
prevalent amongst Muslims. These strains would thus be connected by their rejection of Zionism 
but separate in the way they manifest themselves. Due to these evident complexities, some have 
avoided the ‘new’ terminology and have instead promulgated several other appellations in order to 
specify the type of antisemitism associated with ‘Arab-Muslims’ in France such as ‘banlieue’,48 
‘ghetto’49 or ‘pro-Palestinian’50 antisemitism. In the French debate, a common complaint about this 
phenomenon was its supposed respectability and immunity to criticism, especially as it relates to 
those on the Left and their response to it. Thus the widely respected historian Michel Winock 
lamented that:  
 
When the enemy is fascism, when antisemitism has the name of Le Pen, everything is clear. When 
the most abusive antisemitic insults and the most blatant acts of antisemitism can be traced to those 
in France whose origins are in the Third World, antisemitism becomes rather less important, 
respectable even.51 
 
At the heart of the argument advanced by proponents of the ‘new antisemitism’ label is that 
the line distinguishing anti-Zionism and criticism of Israel from antisemitism has become 
increasingly blurred. Many present anti-Zionism as forming the ideological core of ‘new 
antisemitism’ and some have even claimed that anti-Zionism is inherently antisemitic and that the 
two concepts are essentially ‘Siamese twins’.52 Taguieff introduces a certain amount of confusion 
into his own argument by identifying two types of anti-Zionism, the first involving the ‘critique of 
Israeli policy’ and the second characterised by ‘bringing into question Israel’s right to exist’.53 Only 
the second type can of course actually be considered as anti-Zionism. Such critiques of anti-
Zionism and are not only erroneous but also unhelpful when trying to analytically entangle these 
two concepts. They must be treated separately as it should be conceivable that someone could 
oppose the existence of Israel and not bear any prejudice against Jews, just as one could hate Jews 
but still (paradoxically) be a fervent supporter of the Zionist cause.54 Further proof of this argument 
is the existence of significant Jewish opposition to Zionism or what David Myers calls ‘principled 
anti-Zionism’.55 Unless we accept the idea that these individuals are merely all ‘self-hating Jews’, it 
becomes evident that their opposition must be based on something more than antisemitism (even 
though technically it would not be impossible to be both Jewish and antisemitic). Equally, the fact 
that anti-Zionism and antisemitism are not interchangeable does not mean that anti-Zionism or anti-
Zionists cannot be antisemitic. As the late French philosopher and prominent scholar of racism 
Christian Delacampagne once noted, ‘even if anti-Zionism is not automatically intrinsic to hostility 
towards Jews, one cannot deny that it has often served, since 1967, as an alibi for antisemitism that 
has not only come from the Right but equally from the Left’.56 Such would be the case where the 
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term ‘Zionist’ becomes merely a euphemism for ‘Jew’ such as the idea of a ‘Zionist conspiracy’.57 
In most cases though is of course impossible to know whether an anti-Zionist statement is actually 
motivated by antisemitism. 
The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) has attempted to address the 
thorny issue of when antisemitism may manifest itself with regard to the state of Israel. According 
to its working definition of antisemitism, this includes claiming that Israel is a racist endeavour, 
using classic antisemitic symbols to characterise the country, making comparisons with Israeli and 
Nazi policy and holding Jews as collectively responsible for the actions of the state of Israel.58 This 
endeavour is also limited though as it often just identifies when criticism crosses the line from fair 
to foul rather than providing a set of criteria that would help to distinguish when something 
becomes antisemitic, or in other words, the construction of Israel as ‘the Jew’. Some have also 
argued that this definition merely serves to uphold a new orthodoxy that anti-Zionism can be 
equated with antisemitism.59 There are still a variety of nebulous areas that the definition does not 
address. If, for example, it is antisemitic to compare Israel’s actions to Nazi atrocities, is it 
antisemitic to compare Israel to Apartheid South Africa?60 It is inevitable that any discussion of 
these factors will remain subjective and the fact that Israel is a state essentially governed by Jews 
will perhaps inevitably interfere with the way people criticise its policies.61 For this reason alone, 
the suspicion that criticism of Israel represents a thinly veiled cover for antisemitism will probably 
continue to persist, even if this is probably rarely the case. 
 
Is it really new? 
 
The contemporary debate about a ‘new antisemitism’, both in France and internationally, repeats 
much of the discussion that developed in the 1980s focusing on whether critical attitudes towards 
Zionism or opposition to the State of Israel and its policies had given a new impetus to or 
constituted a new form of antisemitism.62 The use of such a term is essentially problematic as it 
would imply that the internal nature of antisemitism has changed so as to be quantifiably different 
from forms of antisemitism which preceded it (or continue to exist along side it). Approaches that 
distinguish ‘new’ from ‘old’ and ‘classic’ from ‘modern’ seem to ignore the essential continuity of 
antisemitism throughout history and the fact that many aspects of antisemitism we see today can be 
traced back to stereotypes that have existed for hundreds, if not thousands of years. As Yehuda 
Bauer once noted regarding the supposed differences between newer and older forms of 
antisemitism:  
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Antisemitism in the post-Holocaust world is, in principle, not that different from the pre-1939 
variety, similarly combining continuity and new developments. The terminology used by some 
commentators, which tries to differentiate between ‘classical’ and ‘modern’ (or racist) antisemitism 
is much too rigid. We have already seen how the Nazis adapted old concepts to fit new realities. 
Hence, to differentiate ‘classical’ antisemitism from new versions is a dangerous and potentially 
misleading exercise.63 
 
The assessment that Israel has replaced ‘the Jew’ is equally hard to establish despite the fact 
that that there are new groups of antisemites and the nature, frequency and perpetrators of 
antisemitic acts in France has changed. Perhaps the key problem with the ‘new antisemitism’ 
terminology is that it refers to two aspects which may not necessarily be related, or at least emanate 
from entirely distinct ideological perspectives. As Paul Thibaud notes, the use of an expression such 
as nouvel antisémitisme is questionable as it ‘affirms that there is a link and even a continuity 
between, on the one hand, antisemitic harassment in certain banlieues, and on the other hand, the 
hostility towards Israel shared by the vast majority of public opinion.’64 The only common 
reference point of this ‘new antisemitism’ is Israel; however hostility towards Israel or anti-Zionism 
cannot of course always be traced to a hatred of Jews. In fact, the greatest problem facing scholars 
of this subject is assessing the motives for antisemitic attacks. Just as we are unable to always know 
whether criticism of Israel is motivated by anti-Jewish prejudice, we cannot easily assess whether 
an attack on a synagogue is driven by the hatred of Jews as ‘Israeli fellow travellers’65, the 
construction of Israel as ‘the Jew’ in the antisemitic world-view or as something completely 
disconnected from the situation in the Middle East. Antisemites themselves have understood this 
quandary perfectly and hence it is increasingly rare that one finds an outright condemnation of ‘the 
Jews’, except in the most extreme and marginalised circles. Therefore, it is increasingly the term 
‘Zionists’ that is used, making anti-Zionism the ‘lingua franca of many modern day antisemites’.66 
The task of identifying when anti-Zionism is antisemitic is both a thankless and futile one. 
Neither antisemitism which emanates from the Left nor that of Muslims can be described as 
a particularly recent occurrence. Antisemitism on the Left in France has a long history and, in terms 
of opposition to Israel, can at least be traced back to the 1960s. Neither has Muslim hostility 
towards Jews developed within the last few years. Antisemitism associated with Muslims in Europe 
is naturally a controversial issue, but perhaps one that needs to be researched most urgently.67 The 
two vectors of ‘new antisemitism’ are not only old; they also need to be separated from each other 
in order to be rationally analysed. The accusation of a genuine leftist antisemitism, which could be 
compared to that of the extreme right, is, at any rate, extremely disingenuous. First, there is so far 
no evidence that shows that people identifying themselves with the Left in France are involved in 
acts of antisemitism and no major leader of the Left in France has made comments which could be 
described as antisemitic. The majority of those on the Left in France are, given that they support a 
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two-state solution, not even anti-Zionists let alone antisemitic. The only possible criticism that 
could be levelled against members of the left is that their stance against Israel might inadvertently 
encourage antisemitism by proxy, something which of course can be neither proven nor measured. 
Shulamit Volkov has asked ‘whether the position towards Israel today, which has become a central 
issue for the European Left, can still be considered a cultural code or whether it rather indicates a 
more direct anti-Jewish attack’.68 There appears to be little evidence for the latter in the case of 
France and the extreme right still poses more of a threat to Jews than the extreme left. This form of 
antisemitism can hardly be described as ‘old’, especially as the classic antisemitic texts such as ‘The 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion’ may inspire many of the ‘new’ antisemites. What we have 
witnessed in recent years in France appears to be simply a new face of an old hatred, a continuation 
of a phenomenon that has existed for centuries, always evolving, but essentially remaining the 
same. As Le Monde journalist Nicolas Weill correctly pointed out: ‘There can be no question that 
the perpetrators of antisemitism have changed or rather diversified. But the idioms through which 
this ‘new antisemitism’ expresses itself, sadly re-emerge from a rather ‘classical’ register’.69  
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Figure 1 should be a line graph entitled ‘Recorded levels of antisemitism in France’ which 
incorporates the following statistics: 
 
Year Antisemitic 
threats 
Antisemitic 
violence 
Combined antisemitic 
incidents 
1997 90 3 93 
1998 80 1 81 
1999 70 12 82 
2000 625 119 744 
2001 187 32 219 
2002 739 197 936 
2003 474 127 601 
2004 774 200 974 
2005 409 99 508 
2006 434 137 571 
2007 280 106 386 
2008   297    100   397 
The two graphs below give an indication of how fig. 1 should be presented. If there is enough space 
in the article, these graphs themselves could perhaps also be included. 
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Figure 2 should be a column graph entitled ‘Perpetrators of antisemitic violence in France’ based on 
the image below 
 
 
 
 
As the numbers are difficult to read, here are the relevant statistics 
 
Year Extreme right ‘Arab-Muslims’ Other Overall 
1997 1 0 2 3 
1998 1 0 0 1 
1999 8 3 1 12 
2000 5 109 5 119 
2001 1 10 21 32 
2002 3 51 143 197 
2003 6 44 77 127 
2004 14 67 119 200 
2005 10 41 48 99 
2006 15 38 84 137 
2007 12 36 58 106 
 
Source: Commision Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme (2008) 
 
The source for all these statistics is Commision Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme, La 
lutte contre le racisme, l’antisémitisme  et la xénophobie. Année 2007. (Paris: La documentation 
Française 2008). Permission may have to be sought from the CNCDH. 
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